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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Conference
Noise due to aircraft was considered to be a potential problem
as far back as 1952, when the Doolittle Commission established by
President Truman urged that a major effort be made to reduce aircraft
noise. With the 'advent of the jet age in the late 1950's and the
concomitant spread of suburbs towards airports in major cities such
as New York, Denver, and Minneapolis-St. Paul, many more people
became exposed to noise, and concern and anger intensified. Although
only a small percentage (estimated at about 2-3%) of the total
population of the U.S. is affected by high noise levels, these people
and their representatives have been quite vocal about their dissatisfaction
with noise abatement progress, even though technological advances
have reduced the noise emanating from aircraft engines. As a result,
the airports, the communities, and the federal government are
seeking additional measures that will further diminish the noise impact
of aircraft and airport operations.
The dilemma is to decrease noise with the minimum economic
disruptions to commerce, the community, and the aviation industry.
Since very few people like to travel during the night hours (approximately
10 p.m. - 7 a.m.), and indeed very few aircraft operations take place
(less than 5% of total operations at most airports), an environmentally
and politically appealing option to diminish the effect of aircraft noise
is to ban airplane operations during nighttime hours. However, a
disproportionate number of operations at night are dedicated to cargo
(about 50% of scheduled domestic all-cargo flights), and it is upon the
air cargo industry and those users dependent upon nighttime flights
-2-
that the major burden of a curfew would fall. The benefits of curfews
are apparent; the economic penalties associated with them are not.
To address this issue, the Flight Transportation Laboratory of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology hosted a week-long conference
at Jupiter, Florida, in January, 1979, on the impact of airport use
restrictions on air freight. This conference was sponsored by the
Federal Aviation Administration and the Port Authority of New York
and New Jersey. More than 70 participants, including some 50 panelists
and speakers, represented various viewpoints of the air cargo industry:
the users, the airlines, the airports, the communities, and various
governmental agencies.
Summary of Findings
Certain dominant themes emerged early in the proceedings and were
repeated, with some important variations, as the conference unfolded..
Curfews were generally identified as a local, rather than national,
sub-issue of the noise problem, although some arguments were advanced
that the federal government should disallow the imposition of curfews
at any U.S. airport. Curfews come in many variations, some of which are
perceived as being more onerous than others. Absolute curfews on
scheduled operations during a specific time interval falling between
10 p.m. and 7 a.m. wem considered the least acceptable, because they
provide the least flexibility to the users of the system. There are
voluntary curfews (Minneapolis-St. Paul) and formal curfews (Toronto).
Some airports have developed curfews which distinguish between aircraft
which do or do not comply with FAR 36; some bar jets only; some allow
operations on certain runways; and some limit the overall number of
flights during nighttime hours. Finally, some airports have imposed
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combinations of these options.
The question of curfews, pro and con, was rapidly identified as
a social benefit versus economic cost argument. The social benefits
to people impacted by noise were obvious, although some questioned why
noise had not been a conscious consideration in their initial decision
to locate or continue to live near airports. Indeed, a telling argument
against curfews was that an immediate economic penalty to the communities
around airports would be that jobs currently associated with the
nighttime activities would either be eliminated or curtailed. The
longer term economic disruptions to the metropolitan area due to
nighttime restrictions, and subsequent secondary effects upon the airport
communities, were also identified as probable consequences. Finally,
the likely addition to the number of operations occurring near the
curfew deadlines could in turn lead to a substantial increase in
annoyance during those periods.
Air freight has grown because it has filled a need for a fast and
reliable transportation service, going beyond the emergency shipments
of medical supplies and other urgently needed goods. Users are willing
to pay a premium because they perceive that this service allows them to
increase their overall business (by selling perishable or dated goods
in areas beyond the reach of a cheaper but slower mode), to decrease
their overall distribution costs (by reducing inventory and warehousing
needs and capital costs), or both.
Curfews are anathema to these service goals because of the temporal
nature of the businesses which have come to rely on airfreight, be they
manufacturing, retail, perishable or dated goods industries. The air
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freight forwarding industry, which handles about 50% of the total
domestic tonnage shipped by air, and 70% of the tonnage shipped during
the nighttime hours, equally opposes the curfew concept. (Internationally,
nighttime traffic tendered by forwarders rises to about 85%.)
The air freight forwarder cycle is as follows: pick up goods at the
close of business at various locations, consolidate them, and truck
them to the airport, reversing the process in the morning hours.
Thus goods arrive at the airport late (after 8 p.m., generally): a
decrease in this time cycle means an increase in the manpower and
vehicles required to handle the same overall volume, leading to
higher costs through decreased utilization and efficiency. The air
freight forwarders expect to get the goods to the airlines on the same
night, not only to insure speedy delivery, but also to avoid the costs
associated with warehousing. Without structural changes in the air
freight forwarding industry, overnight delivery is essential for
forwarders, even if not for the shippers themselves.
Representing the shipper's point of view, a radioisotope manufacturer
is a perfect example of how curfews would affect business on all
possible levels:
(1) The shipper needs fast service; radioisotopes have a half-life
of two-and-one-half days and a curfew would reduce the useful
life of this product.
(2) The shipper needs highly reliable service; excessive delays
would render radioisotopes useless.
(3) The shipper has centralized his manufacturing and distribution
facilities because of availability of air freight; a curfew
would limit the radioisotope manufacturer's market potential.
.A-W 11001,16,01 1100,140" --- - __ __ 
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Shippers in different industries and areas depend on air freight
because of one or more of the above considerations: the cut flower
industry uses air because overnight shipment eliminates the need to
refrigerate flowers; retailers use it because it prolongs the sales
life of high-fashion garments, minimizing inventory and shortening the
period that capital is tied up in stock; manufacturers of high value
items use it to eliminate many regional manufacturing and distribution
facilities while still not incurring a service disadvantage with respect
to local suppliers and manufacturers. Curfews would affect all industries
dependent on air freight; the degree of impact depends on how critical
overnight delivery is to their operation.
Additionally, airline revenues would be decreased by the amount of
revenue diverted to other modes (if indeed diversion, rather than out-
right elimination of shipments, took place). Curfews could add as
much as twenty-four hours to the delivery time of most shipments, bringing
the speed of air down to that of surface modes up to distances of about
one thousand miles.
The curfew sensitive operations are basically the all-cargo flights;
some 50% would be affected by nighttime curfews, compared to only
about 10% of the cargo capacity available from passenger operations. These
percentages are based on the assumption that curfews would be imposed
at all U.S. airports; closing down only specific airports at night
would naturally have widely differing impacts on the industry. For
example, if Chicago were subject to a curfew and no alternative airport
were open, Flying Tiger operations in the midwest would essentially cease.
Some 70% of Federal Express' capacity would be lost to a curfew at Memphis.
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The international cargo carriers (Pan Am, Seaboard, and Flying Tiger)
are able to cope with curfews in other parts of the world because the
U.S. gateways do not impose curfews.
Airlines would have several options if restrictions were enforced.
These include such immediate steps as rescheduling flights at
curfew affected airports and diverting flights to close-by airports
without curfews (if available). Weather and operational delays would
now become more economically severe if they cause flights to be delayed
into the curfew hours. Longer term solutions include purchasing additional
aircraft (if the airline's strategy is to maintain the same overall
lift capacity), or reducing frequency and eliminating markets. Pan
Am estimates that a 15% increase in its international cargo fleet
would be required to cope with U.S. curfews; Flying Tigers estimates
a 10% increase in its domestic direct operating costs, given curfews
at Los Angeles, New York and Chicago (with Chicago operations moved).
The impact on airports of curfews would be both operational and
economic. A negative economic impact would result from the under-
utilization of the infrastructure even if all flights were rescheduled
and no revenue was lost from airlines. Operational problems could arise
because of the likelihood of a great number of operations scheduled
around the curfew deadlines, as well as more peaking of landside cargo
traffic.
The final theme that emerged from the conference was that ultimately
the consumer would pay for all the increased costs that curfews would
bring about. The growth in the air freight industry that has taken
place to date would stop and major changes in its structure would have
to take place before it commenced to grow again, if at all.
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INTRODUCTION
Conference Purpose
The purpose of the conference was to investigate, quantify (where
possible) and document the attitude of the air freight industry toward
airport restrictions, and to gauge the potential overall economic
impact of such restrictions. Topics that were addressed included:
the magnitude of diversion or abandonment of air shipments; cost impacts;
changing attitudes of shippers; changes in the industry, such as re-
location; changes in airport usage; and other collateral effects such
as " energy" utilization changes.
Participants in the conference were invited from the ranks of air
freight shippers, carriers, airports, government agencies, and the academic
community. The basic structure of the conference was that of panel
sessions in the morning and afternoon, followed by discussion periods.
Keynote speeches began each day's proceedings. A list of keynote
speakers, panelists, participants, and selected papers are contained
in Appendices A-D.
Background Information
In the last 20 years, aircraft noise has become a major problem
around the world. Environmental groups, in general, and people from
neighborhoods surrounding the airports, in particular, have expressed
serious concern about the impact of aircraft noise on their lives. Among
the possible noise abatement options available, these groups have focused
on the establishment of nighttime curfews to avoid the disruption of
sleep. The airlines, the shippers, and the airport operators understand
NO " NO 
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and respect the communities' concern about this problem, but they are
also concerned about the economic impact of curfews. There is no
question that aircraft noise is a recognized problem and that it is
a shared responsibility to effectively deal with the issue; the question
is whether curfews represent an equitable and effective solution in
each case, given the associated economic penalties.
Although procedural attempts were made as early as the mid-fifties
to bar jet aircraft operations at urban airports, there was no specific
reference to noise in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. The New York
Port Authority (now the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey) was
one of the first to adopt a policy disallowing jet aircraft into its
airports until they could operate within certain noise level standards;
the noise levels could not exceed those of the largest propeller
aircraft (1).
At the federal government level, the Office of Noise Abatement was
established within the Department of Transportation in 1967. The 1958
Act was amended in 1968 to allow the FAA to prescribe and amend standards
for the measurement, control, and abatement of aircraft noise (2).
As a result, in 1969 the FAA prescribed noise standards for new aircraft
(Public Law 90-411). In December 1976, the FAA issued a regulation
requiring all turbojet aircraft of more than 75,000 pounds (gross weight)
to comply with the established noise standards by January 1, 1985.
At about the same time, the Department of Transportation published
a comprehensive Aviation Noise Abatement Policy which had as its under-
lying philosophy that the fight against aviation noise was a joint
responsibility of government, air carriers, airport proprietors, and
citizens. Additionally, the federal government focused on aircraft landing
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and takeoff procedures to promote noise abatement.
Local airport operators were encouraged to consider actions such
as curfews, quotas, landing fees, preferential runway use, and acquisition
of land adjacent to the airport boundary to reduce noise. However, in
taking these actions, the airport operators were not to Jiscriminate un-
justly against users, impede safety, or unduly burden interstate or
foreign commerce or Federal treaty obligations (3). It therefore
becomes exceedingly important to be able to judge when these factors
come into play. Determination of "undue burdens" is perhaps the most
difficult of these to make.
At the present time a number of airports around the world either
have in use or have planned for the immediate future a number of types
of airport restrictions. In a recently conducted world-wide survey
with 139 respondents, the Airport Operators Council International (AOCI)
reported the following information:
Of the 24 U.S. large hub airports responding, 15 reported noise
abatement programs, including two with night curfews;
Of 40 major non-U.S. airports, 35 reported noise abatement programs,
including 17 with night curfews;
Of 21 U.S. medium hub airports, 12 reported noise abatement programs,
including 3 with night curfews;
Of 33 U.S. small hub airports, 14 reported noise abatement programs
including 5 with night curfews; and
Of 7 U.S. reliever-type airports, 5 reported noise abatement
programs, including 3 with night curfews.
The individual airports and their curfew hours are shown in Table 1.
Common types of airport restrictions include noise abatement
takeoff and landing procedures which may provide: (1) assignment of
AIRPORT HOURS OF NIGHT CURFEW (BASED ON GREENWICH MEAN TINE)Table 1
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arrival/departure headings to keep aircraft from flying over populated
areas, (2) establishment of minimum altitudes, (3) use of segmented
approaches and steep climbouts, and (4) use of preferential/rotational
runway-user programs. The latter programs assign runways that keep
the aircraft away from the critical areas, or rotate aircraft operations
to disperse noise. equally over populated areas.
Nighttime curfews are more common at non-U.S. airports. For example,
in a recent survey of 61 countries, the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) found that 22 countries have implemented curfews: 14
in Europe, I in the Caribbean/South America region, 4 in the Middle East/
Southwest Asia, and 3 in the North America/Pacific region; these 22 countries
report 52 airports having nighttime curfews.
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CONFERENCE REPORT
USERS
Direct Shippers
Shippers pay a premium to be able to tender their consignments
at night and have them transported during the night for next morning
delivery. At the close of the business day, these shippers need time
to collect, process, and transport their goods to the airports. It
was evident from the information presented by the Massachusetts Port
Authority that the real success of late night departures was related
precisely to the lateness of the departure. Although carriers offer
substantial rate incentives to transport freight on their passenger
flights during the daylight hours, many shippers choose the option of
paying a premium for late night departures.
Time-sensitive air freight commodities are best served by overnight
delivery, perishables being the most obvious. For example, cut flowers
have consistently ranked in the top ten commodities shipped by air
freight. California and Florida rank one and two, respectively, in the
production of cut flowers in the United States. In Florida, these
ornamental crops are produced, primarily, from the first of October through
the end of June, at various farming locations scattered throughout the
state. The growers and shippers of these flowers market them to whole-
salers and retailers located throughout the United States and Canada.
Since this is a very perishable commodity, the crop is shipped
either by air freight or refrigerated trucks, Shipments that proceed on
air freight are not refrigerated; therefore, time is of the essence.
-13-
The crop is harvested during the early morning hours, transported
to the packinghouses where it is graded and packed into shipping containers.
It is then transported to the truck terminal or air freight terminal
for shipment. By the time this is accomplished, it is late afternoon
or early evening. Historically, these flowers are put on flights
departing after 6:00 p.m., to arrive, in most cases, at their northern
and western destinations during the night and early morning hours for
sale by wholesalers to retailers at the start of each day for that
day's market and use. Obtaining frequent fresh supplies of flowers
is preferable to buying a whole week's supply at one time, since they are
highly perishable.
If airports were forced to close at night, the flowers would be held
at the terminals overnight and then moved the following morning.
Even if these morning departures were in the early daylight hours,
the arrival time at northern markets would still be too late for that
day's business and would necessitate holding the flowers over for another
twenty-four hour period. Curfews would have a drastic impact on this
industry.
An example of dated commodities exists in the printed-matter
industry which requires the availability of both scheduled and non-
scheduled air carriers throughout any 24-hour period. The needs of
Time, Inc. vary from the individual minimum 5-pound package containing
fast-breaking news film to 40,000 pounds of printed pages, loaded on
pallets. The company is so concerned about the potential delay to
film-packet shipments due to factors such as curfews that it is developing
an electronic page transmission system between New York and other printing
plants. Time, Inc. emphasized that publication of news cannot work
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around curfews; news events around the world obviously occur regardless
of the time of day in New York.
U.S. News and World Report tenders over 30,000 pounds of airfreight
per week; 97% of this is tendered during the weekend hours and about 13%
is intended for departures and/or arrivals during proposed curfew hours.
Magazine production begins at midnight each Friday and continues through
0800 each Sunday. In the event of curfews, the magazine would not be
able to utilize airfreight services for 16 of the 32 production hours.
Furthermore, the company could not rely on daytime airfreight service
because of probable lack of sufficient capacity. First, cancellation
of nighttime flights would have an impact on some daytime flights
due to rescheduling. Second, the U.S. Post Office, which takes about
20% of the volume at night, would utilize much of the cargo space
available on daytime combination flights. Third, the baggage of shifted
passenger traffic would utilize much of the space on the combination
flights.
Another example of time sensitive shipments is National Airlines
Flight 97 which departs New York's JFK airport at 1:30 a.m. and arrives
in Miami at 0345 a.m. This flight typically carries some 12,000 pounds
of newspapers, including the New York Times, the Daily News, the Racing
Form and the Jewish Floridian, which must be distributed early in the morning
to the many hotels catering to the important tourist trade along the
south Florida Gold Coast. These papers cannot arrive at JFK prior to
midnight due to printing schedules. In fact, on Flight 97, the First
Class seats are not sold but covered over so that the newspapers can
be placed on them.
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In addition to the above examples, there are a significant number
of businesses that depend on rapid response and overnight delivery. The
aviation industry, for example, depends upon 24-hour air freight for
parts replacement programs. Planes which are grounded pending arrival
of parts require an immediate response--or air schedules cannot be met.
In the research and development industry, critical items for equipment
undergoing test programs must be moved expeditiously or critical time
schedules cannot be met and costs will soar. In the drug industry,
providing drugs for treatment requires rapid response whether the
reason is the comfort of the patient, preventingpossible complications
which can be caused by delay, or in numerous emergency situations,
preventing death itself. Despite the higher costs of air freight,
compared to surface modes, total distribution cost analysis has made
a case for air freight by providing higher profits. The flexible use
of air freight can eliminate warehousing, increase sales, decrease
handling costs, decrease insurance costs, and reduce the time during
which goods are tied up in transit. Although the average shipper may
not be familiar with distribution cost analysis, shipper surveys show
a certain amount of understanding of this concept.
As an example of the decision to use air freight based on distribution
cost analysis, consider the case of American Optical, a major manufacturer
of optical products such as eyeglass frames; the major product line
produces approximately 20,000 stock-keeping items. The manufacturing
and distribution point for the company is located in Southbridge,
Massachusetts; 65 miles from Boston's Logan, 45 miles from Hartford's
Bradley, and 160 miles from the major New York and New Jersey airports.
American Optical uses air freight as a distribution tool because
of the relatively high value of its products and the wide range of its
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stock-keeping items. The latter characteristic makes it financially
unsound to maintain a complete product line at all branch and distributor
locations. The companytherefore, relies heavily upon the speed and
dependability of air freight for planned shipments as well as emergency
stock outs.
The daily shipping orders are received by the company by mid to
late afternoon, due to its geographic location (Eastern Time Zone). The
orders are processed and ready for shipment in the late afternoon or early
evening when arrangements are made (for example, with air freight
forwarders) for pickup. By the time the shipments reach the airport
of departure, it is usually 9 p.m. to midnight; in time for late night
and very early morning departures. Goods can therefore be recovered
at the destination airports early enough to provide same-day delivery
to the company's branches and customers.
In the event of nighttime curfews, next-day delivery will no
longer be possible, placing a company like American Optical at a
definite disadvantage compared to local suppliers and manufacturers.
Carrying more inventory at the branch and distributor level to compensate
for the increased delivery time, on the other hand, would drastically
increase carrying costs which would eventually have to be passed on to
the public. The imposition of curfews would, therefore, make the use
of air freight service less attractive to shippers such as American
Optical. This is true for many companies which have located their
manufacturing facilities in or near certain metropolitan areas primarily
because of the excellent air freight schedules available at nearby
airports which facilitate national and even international distribution.
A number of companies have centralized manufacturing facilities rather
-- . ovi
-17-
than establish satellite plants in a number of different locations
because of the availability of air freight services. Centralization
of manufacturing facilities results in savings which can be shared by
the consumer and the manufacturer. These companies have found that
replacing redundant manufacturing facilities with a distribution system
served by air transportation provides distinct advantages and real
savings to the consumer.
Companies which have made this decision and have already constructed
both manufacturing and distribution facilities based upon the availability
of air freight services would be in a disastrous situation if they were
to lose a significant portion of this service. Untold millions and
probably billions of dollars in facilities would have to be revamped,
replaced or abandoned.
As another example, in 1967 it became evident to Hoechst-Roussel
Pharmaceutical that it could not develop the pharmaceutical markets
located in the western states without the benefit of air transportation
to overcome the distance between its manufacturing plant and the
ultimate consumer. Hoechst-Roussel recognized the fact that as a
small company, with a relatively new product, it could not justify nor
afford remote distribution centers to expand successfully in these
distant markets. With the introduction of containerized methods of
handling air freight, Hoechst-Roussel immediately took
advantage of this concept and used it as the primary means of not only
transportation but of bringing its markets within a reasonable and
competitive delivery time from its plant in Ohio.
Utilizing air transportation Hoechst-Roussel was able to nearly
equalize the time in transit to all of its customers located at distances
6f over 750 miles with those located less than 750 miles from their plants.
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Today, Hoechst-Roussel is among the top twenty
ethical pharmaceutical manufacturers and distributes the fifth most
frequently prescribed drug in the nation. Air transportation is still
a key factor in its ability to service its customers' needsfrom the
routine daily containe.'ized shipments for distribution to the west
and southwest, to the life and death emergency shipments that require
same day delivery. Hoechst-Roussel utilizes air transportation as
the primary means of distribution to over thirty-five per cent of its
markets.
For Hoeschst-Roussel, curtailment of air traffic would translate
into accelerated plans for additional remote distribution centers, and
could quite possibly curtail seriously the company's ability to service
the public in cases of life and death situations.
However, Hoeschst-Roussel feels that even if it were feasible
to redirect air freight traffic, the entire system would have to be
revamped. Warehouses would have to be built to hold expanded inventories
necessitated by a slower distribution system; and the entire business
cycle would have to be drastically revamped. The net result would be
that the consumer would either receive less responsive service or would
have to pay a higher price for commodities purchased.
Federated Department Stores, a company with annual revenues of $5
billion in retail outlets across the country, has adopted the total
distribution concept. Air freight has become an integral part of
Federated's profit plan; 60t of its transportation dollar is for air.
Air freight is viewed as a business tool to be wielded positively in
minimizing inventory and warehousing,shortening the period that capital
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is tied up in stockand protecting the company against obsolescence
of its merchandise, some of which, like high fashion garments, has an
average shelf-life of 16 days.
Over the years, the air freight industry has persuaded Federated
Department Stores, American Optical, Hoechst-Roussel and many other
corporations to depend upon air freight and to build it into the
fabric of their business strategy. Adoption of curfews is seen by
those users as a dangerous policy which will threaten their normal
way of doing business.
Forwarders
Air freight forwarders derive their revenue from the spread between
the higher small shipment rates paid to them by shippers and the lower
*
volume shipment rates that: they in turn, pay to airlines. The
forwarders therefore need time to collect, process, consolidate, and
deliver large shipments to the carriers. Nighttime departures, freighter
or otherwise, are of prime concern to this segment of the industry
which accounts for about 50% of the domestic airfreight revenues.
In one survey, 83% of the forwarders were willing to pay higher rates
to maintain overnight service (5). The desirability of nighttime
service (primetime lift) is echoed by the Emery Air Freight Company
which chartered aircraft to serve its short- and intermediate-haul
markets. This forwarder, the largest in the industry, moves almost
There are, of course, other services provided by the air freight for-
warders in addition to consolidation. These may include, for instance,
pick-up and delivery, packing, storage, insurance, and paperwork (4).
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two-thirds of its traffic between 2300 and 0300. The forwarders are
therefore concerned about the impact of curfews since they consider
overnight delivery as the key selling point of their service (6).
U.S. Post Office
Another impact of airport curfews would be the delay in the move-
ment of air mail. At the present time, approximately 25% of the total
number of pieces of all types of mail shipped (including international)
is transported by airlines and one fifth of the air mail, or 4.9
billion pieces per year, moves in aircraft departing during the
hours 2200 and 0700.
Mail originating in a specific local area is usually received in
post offices at 5:00 p.m. or later. The collection and processing of
that mail generally requires three to four hours, with additional
time needed for transportation to the airport. Therefore, again,
depending on the local situation, this mail is often not available
for flights departing before 9:00 p.m. In such situations, the Postal
Service is dependent upon late evening and early morning air flights
to meet its current service standards. In locations where curfews
have been established or where they might be established, the Postal
Service would be forced to hold much of this mail over for the departing
morning flights, ususally in combination aircraft. There could be
some problems with lift capacity on early morning flights if most of this
mail was held over. The net effect would probably be a lengthening
.of the required service time to certain areas of the country depending
again on flight availability in the early part of the day. Under
the Post Office's current service standards, it generally tries to
deliver preferential mail within the second delivery day to destinations
between 150 and 600 miles from the origin point. Some of these destina-
tions would probably fall back to a three-day service standard with the
imposition of an airport curfew (7).
The Banking Industry
The banking industry uses the airline industry to transport
checks, drafts and other financial documents. Airport curfews would
have a significant impact on this industry in terms of implicit losses
of funds tied up in transportation, resulting in reduced investment
potential. For example, the Boston banking comunity estimated that
about four million cancelled checks, drawn on banks outside New England,
pass through the Federal Reserve Bank every night. More than $300
billion in checks intended for clearing move by air, at night, between
New York City banks and other banks in the nation. It is estimated
that a 24-hour delay would result in more than $35 million a year loss
in interest charges (8).
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AIRLINES
During 1978, the U.S. scheduled airlines generated approximately
seven billion cargo-ton miles. Although all of the 14,000 flights
operated daily by the U.S. airlines carry some type of cargo, a dis-
proportionate share of cargo is hauled at night for delivery the next
morning. As noted, this includes time-sensitive commodities such as
perishable produce, pharmaceuticals, cancelled checks, fashion goods and
mail. In this growing air freight industry, the imposition of nighttime
airport curfews would be detrimental to the airlines causing substantial
impacts on the volumes shipped and serious scheduling problems resulting
in increased operating costs and reduced fleet utilization.
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 has produced a new regulatory
environment for the U.S. airlines. With lower passenger fares and new
cargo service in many markets, air traffic has been increasing signifi-
cantly in recent months. Airport curfews would act counter to the
current deregulation philosophy and would restrict the airlines in
their efforts to provide full air transportation services to meet the
public need.
A good many of the shippers (particularly from the manufacturing
industry) tender their goods at the end of the business day for trans-
portation during the night. If the aircraft leaves earlier in the night,
the carrier would lose potential revenue. For example, Heathrow Airport
in London restricts arrivals and departures between 2330 and 0630.
Pan American would prefer to schedule oneof its flights from New York
through Brussels to London, arriving at London at midnight and departing
for New York at 0300, the earliest time at which most of the freight
-23-
*
out of London is available for departure. The existence of the curfew
forces Pan Am to fly the schedule as New York-London-Brussels-New York;
the flight arrives and departs London before 2330. The carrier
estimates a loss of $3 million per year due to the premature departure.
At the time a curfew was being considered at Boston's Logan
Airport, an analysis indicated that 20% of all scheduled commercial
arrivals and departures could be adjusted to comply with the curfew
period; about 30% could be adjusted with difficulty; and about 50%
would have to be cancelled. The air carriers employ about 6700
people in Boston; about 14% of these employees work the night shift
and about 64% of these in turn work in the areas of maintenance and
freight handling. The Massport study estimated that a 2300-0700
curfew could eliminate 468 jobs; about 50% of which would result
from reductions in flight crews and maintenance workers.
Surveys have consistently shown that the shippers using air freight
have almost invariably made their decision based on a desire to
optimize their delivery schedule. According to the recent survey
conducted by the Boeing Company, freight rates (price) ranks third in
the listing of shipper air transport requirements. Given, then, the
importance of delivery schedule, it is easy to see the impact of
nighttime curfews which would virtually eliminate one-third of the 24
hours available for air cargo scheduling. Furthermore, given the stress
*
Not all of the outbound freight comes from London itself. A large
part of the shipments for this flight is trucked or flown from the
surrounding cities to meet this flight. Thus, an earlier departure
would prevent the trucking connection; an important consideration for
a major airport which serves as a collecting point.
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on the overnight delivery concept, these particular eight hours of
curfew become even more important.
As of September 1978, about 45% of the U.S. domestic freighter
capacity was scheduled between 2400 and 0700, and about 7% of the belly
cargo capacity of passenger aircraft move during this period. Using
these numbers it is estimated that in 1977 about 628,000 tons of
cargo moved between 2400 and 0700 in the United States; this amount
would potentially be influenced by the imposition of curfews. The
1976 Massport study indicated that about 20% of the late-night schedules
can be adjusted to comply with the curfews. Applying a yield of
$457 per ton on freighter cargo, and $354 per ton on passenger lower
hold, it is estimated that $214 million would have been lost to the
U.S. air carriers had curfews existed during 1977.
The imposition of airport curfews at U.S. domestic airports could
extend delivery to the second day instead of next-day, resulting in
some diversion to the surface modes (truckers). The extent of diversion
would depend on the distance the shipment is being hauled and the number
of airports having curfews. As the number of airports with curfews
increases, the alternative of using motor carriers becomes more viable.
Curfews would restrict the number of hours during which freighter
flights could be scheduled. On the other hand, trucks can be dispatched
almost any time of day or night.
In addition to potential diversion to the surface mode, airport
curfews would cause enormous problems for the airline scheduler.
Consider, as an example, Pan American's all-cargo operation. The
carrier operates a fleet of six B-747 freighters on a route pattern that
radiates from New York to: (1) London, Brussels, Frankfurt, Tehran, and
-t 
-~ 
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New Delhi in the Atlantic Division; (2) Port of Spain, Caracas,
Maracaibo, Guatemala, Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo in Latin America ;
(3) Sydney, Auckland, and Samoa in the South Pacific; (4) Guam,
Tokyo, Hong Kong, Kuala Lumpur, and Singapore in the Orient; and
(5) Chicago, Miami, Houston, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Honolulu
in the United States. The scheduling process attempts to strike a
balance between internal constraints (crew work limits and domiciles,
maintenance, ground handling equipment and personnel) and external
constraints (arrival and departure times dictated by market considerations,
time zones, airport congestion and quotas, connections, load factors,
and of course curfews) while attempting to provide maximum frequency
and capacity.
Out of the 26 cities served by Pan American's freighters, seven
have curfew restrictions. These include Auckland, Frankfurt, Hong Kong,
London, Maracaibo, Sydney, and Tokyo. With the exception of the London
curfew discussed earlier, Pan American has been able to provide a
reasonable schedule without incurring severe penalties, partly
because the U.S. gateways served by Pan American have not established
curfews. However, if curfews were to be imposed at New York, Miami,
Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles, and San Francisco from, say, 2300 to
0600, Pan American's freighter operations could be seriously jeopardized.
The current schedule calls for a total of 107 weekly arrivals and de-
partures at these airports, 42% of which occur between 2300 and 0600.
Due to the shrinkage of the operating "windows", fleet utilization would
be reduced by about 20% and Pan American would be forced to acquire
an additional B-747 freighter to maintain its current level of service.
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The costs of acquiring this aircraft at about $60 million would have
to be passed on to the shippers initially in the form of higher cargo
rates. Eventually, the consumers would have to bear these costs in
the form of higher prices charged for the goods transported by air.
Like Pan American, Seaboard World has so far managed to work
around the present curfew situation in Europe, due primarily to the
absence of nighttime restrictions at New York, the carrier's hub.
However, a curfew at JFK would have a severe effect on Seaboard's
trans-Atlantic operations. Currently the carrier achieves a better
than 13-hour utilization on its B-747 fleet. Any delay due to curfews
would reduce this utilization; a 10% reduction would mean a loss of
approximately $80,000 a month on a B-747 aircraft, not counting the
impact of reduced load factors and loss of business.
It is clear that the scheduling process would be severely disrupted
by the imposition of curfews. It should be kept in mind that aircraft
scheduling is closely tied to crew scheduling and in turn to flight
crew working rules. Any deviation from the enforcement of these work
rules can increase operating expenses significantly. Pan Am, for
instance, states that a five-minute delay in departure of its round-
the-world flight could result in "dead-heading" an entire crew, with
concomitant pay and hotel accommodation expenses (9).
Delta Airlines presently operates 1600 daily flights and 400,or
25 percent of these,are in the 6 p.m. - 6 a.m. period. Delta carries
more mail than any other carrier (10 million pieces per day) because
of its extensive night coach operation, even though it does not operate
any pure freighters. The lower belly of the 26 aircraft L-1011 fleet
serves as Delta's "Freighter", but only 40 percent of the available
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lift is utilized, since there is little or no demand for cargo on
daytime flights. Among the principal kinds of shippers using Delta
are NASA, the Department of Defense, the Federal Reserve Bank, auto
assembly plants,and textile manufacturers. Surgical and various types
of radioactive materials for medical use are also among nighttime
commodities. On some of Delta's night flights, notably the DC-8-61
operations, the passenger load factor is only 15 percent, but the revenue
from the belly cargo makes the flight profitable.
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AIRPORTS
The air freight market is highly concentrated among a few airports.
For example, almost 80% of the commercial all-cargo service is between
four cities (Chicago, Los Angeles, New York and San Francisco) and
only some two dozen airports in the U.S. receive daily freighter service.
The consequences of a curfew would be critical at any one of these four
major airports by itself; the situation would be devastating if all
four were to have a curfew imposed.
According to one estimate, the U.S. system of airports served by
the scheduled airlines represents an investment of about $25 billion.
The imposition of nighttime curfews would mean that these large investments
would be less productive. Consider the imposition of a 2300 to 0700
curfew at Boston. A non-stop flight from Los Angeles cannot take-off
after 1500; thus, a nighttime curfew at Boston has become a daytime
curfew at Los Angeles. If there is a 2300-0700 curfew at Los Angeles
as well, then flights non-stop eastbound flights can only depart during 8
of the 24 hours in a day. The problem is even more serious for multi-stop
flights. Therefore airport facilities , not to mention aircraft, would be
underutilized.
One direct impact of an airport curfew would be the rescheduling of
as many flights as possible (both passenger and cargo) just prior to
and after the designated curfew hours. This action would increase
congestion and delay due to the "bunching" of flights at the boundaries
of the curfew. Thus there may be an increase in noise exposure prior
to the curfew at a time when the annoyance is already at a high level.
The additional strain on airport facilities during the non-curfew
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hours may require a premature expansion of these facilities, including
the related infrastructure such as air traffic control systems and airport
access roads. Thus curfews may cause chain reactions in several airport
areas.
Cost considerations are important in rescheduling flights; however,
in some cases rescheduling may not be possible. Consider the airports
with hourly flight quotas. Rescheduling outside the curfew hours and
meeting the quota system may produce a schedule that cannot be marketed,
in which case it may become necessary to cancel the flight altogether.
Air Canada examined the air freight acceptance times at the three
major Canadian airports of Vancouver, Toronto, and Montreal for the months
of October and November 1978 (Figure 1). Acceptance time is defined
as the time at which the shipper tenders his cargo for transport by
the air carrier. These statistics, while biased, are better pattern
indicators of when the cargo would like to move, as opposed to when it
in fact physically moves. They are biased because shippers tailor, to
an extent, their offering of cargo according to the carrier's published
timetable.
The amount of cargo tendered for shipment after the end of the
business day increases dramatically over the noon and early afternoon
period. At the two non-curfew airport cities of Vancouver and Montreal,
this late-night peaking phenomenon continues until early morning.
Toronto, on the other hand, with its midnight to seven a.m. curfew,
displays a more uniform distribution throughout the entire day,
For comparison purposes, the average daily cargo for the three
airports was summarized into three time blocks: five in the afternoon
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to ten o'clock at night; ten at night to fiye in the morning; and, finally,
five in the morning to five in the afternoon, The rationale for these
divisions is as follows. The late afternoon peaking begins about the
closing of the business day, that is five o'clock, A curfew at midnight
implies a cut-off time of 10 o'clock for traffic moving the same day,
Traffic tendered after ten p.m. could not move until the end of the curfew
in the morning. Similarly, the five a.m. division is due to traffic
being tendered to go on the first morning flight after the lifting of
the seven o'clock curfew.
A comparison of the airports shows that in the first time period
(5 p.m. to 10 p.m.), Vancouver and Montreal have 31% and 33% of the daily
volume (by weight) tendered, respectively, while Toronto has 21%.
Similarly, for the 10 p.m. to the 5 a.m. block, Vancouver and Montreal
show 58% and 42% of the day's traffic tendered, while Toronto shows
36%. The 5 a.m. to 5 p.m. period has Toronto showing an astounding
43% traffic offering to Vancouver's 11% and Montreal's 25%.
Two items can be inferred from this. First, some overnight traffic
is not being tendered for air transport and, second, some overnight
traffic is tendered in the morning for transport during the day.
To predict what the traffic pattern and volume at Toronto would have
been without a curfew is indeed difficult. A very simplistic method
is to make the 10 p.m. to 5 a.m. period resemble that of Vancouver or
Montreal. Such a projection works out to 750,000 lbs. per month, or
14% of the total Toronto airport volume. This makes the overnight
time period equal to 50% of the day's demand--which is the average of
Montreal and Vancouver. This 750,000 lbs. can be considered as lost
traffic which probably moves by surface mode.
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COMMUNITY
The greatest impact of aircraft noise is felt by communities
adjacent to the airport. However, these communities must evaluate the
benefits of a curfew (noise relief) with the associated costs of
curfews (potential loss of jobs). For example, the number of employees
working at Boston's Logan and living in the noise-impacted communities
is well over 2,000, which represents about 20% of Logan employment and
about 4% of the labor force of these communities.
Although the noise problem exists all day, it is particularly
irritating at night partly because of the low ambient noise and partly
because of the disruption of social activities and sleep, It is true
that only a small fraction of the aircraft operations take place late
at night (for example, about 5% for Boston's Logan airport) but a
substantial portion of the cargo tends to be hauled on these late night
departures. It is also true that a number of cargo carriers operate
older jet aircraft (B-707 and DC-8) which are noisier than the majority
of other aircraft types.
It has always been difficult to quantify the effect of aircraft
noise, partially due to the variability of human response to noise.
However, attempts have been made to estimate the cost of noise through
surrogate measures such as the impact on neighborhood property values,
the cost of insulating homes, court settlements for property damage,
outstanding liability of airport operators, purchases of easements, and
the cost of replacing or retrofitting existing aircraft. In 1976, AOCI
estimated that the noise damages pending nationwide against airport
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operators by local communities wereon the order of $960 million.
This amount would exceed a billion dollars if costs of land acquisition
to preclude the possibility of noise damages were included. It is
interesting to note that the cost of retrofitting all non-FAR Part 36
air carrier airplanes was also estimated to be about one billion dollars.
Moving from the national view to a specific case, the Massport study
estimated that reduced property values for homes in noise-impacted
communities were in a range from $31 million to $133 million.* Addi-
tionally, the cost of replacing homes ranged from $318 million to $557
million and the cost of soundproofing varied from $60 million to
$482 million.
There is no question that the quantity as well as the quality of
air service, particularly air freight service, will deteriorate with the
imposition of nighttime airport curfews. In some cases it may be possible
to maintain the service but at an added cost. Depending on the specific
region, there may be users who feel that they cannot compete with shippers
elsewhere who have access to better service due to the absence of airport
curfews. Depending on how strongly these shippers feel about this
situation, they may decide to reduce their workforce or relocate their
businesses. Either choice on the part of the shipper could have a
significant economic impact on the community. This type of reasoning
led the Massachusetts Port Authority to reconsider its curfew proposal
at Logan Airport.
The following figures illustrate the economic impact of curfews
*
Homes included were in the NEF (Noise Exposure Forecast) 30 contour
and above. NEF measures areas of consistent noise levels and maps them
over the geographic area affected by the aircraft operations. Noise
level above NEF 30 (about 65 decibels) is usually considered unsuitable
for residential use.
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on a typical U.S. industrial city such as Philadephia, Cleveland or
Minneapolis-St. Paul. Boeing estimates that this typical city airport
handles 50,000 tons of cargo per year. If 17% of the cargo is curfew
sensitive and 10% of this curfew-sensitive cargo were to be lost,
the value of this loss equals $17 million, assuming the value of air-
shipped commodities to be $10 per pound. Further, applying a multiplier
effect factor of 1.8, the impact of a curfew would add up to a $31 million
loss to the economy of the typical industrial city.
In order to obtain a more complete picture of the potential
effects of nighttime curfews on the users of the system, it is necessary
to compute the indirect as well as the direct effects, the latter being
the additional costs required to maintain the business activity at pre-
curfew levels. The indirect effects, on the other hand, reflect the
long-run costs associated with curtailment of nighttime curfew operations.
In addition, there are multiplier effects, since changes in one sector
of the economy affect other sectors. The Massport study used an average
wage multiplier of 1.775 and an employment mulitiplier of 1,875; the
implication being that as a result of a curfew, a $100 loss would generate
another $78 loss and that a loss of 100 direct or indirect jobs could
result in another 88 jobs being lost. In the case of Boston's Logan
Airport the direct job loss was estimated at 1114; the indirect at
5830, and the multiplier effect at 6094. The total possible employment
loss due to a curfew being imposed from 2300 to- 0700 was estimated to
be 13058.
Another local economic impact study conducted by the airlines
serving Chicago's O'Hare International Airport was occassioned by the
so-called "noise reduction" proposals by the State of Illinois.
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If instituted, these proposals could result, ultimately, in the elimination
of all flights at O'Hare between 10 p.m. and 7 a.m. and in the cutback
of flights in the remaining daylight hours by 32 per cent.
The report shows that as a result of such restrictions:
---The airlines would have to cancel 577 flights in a typical 24 hour
period. This would deprive service to, or seriously inconvenience, 40,600
passengers.
---The airport would be closed from 10 p.m. to 7 a.m. thus eliminating
113 flight arrivals and departures daily, depriving 6,900 passengers
of night flight opportunities and ending night transport of 875,000
tons of cargo annually.
---The movement of mail would be delayed seriously.
---Employment at the airport would be reduced by about 30 per cent,
causing some 8,000 people to lose their jobs.
Clearly, night curfews and other restrictions on operations at
airports will be costly, and, in the short term at least, will produce
an economic penalty which will be imposed, in part, on the communities
whose concern and well being fostered the imposition of such actions
in the first place.
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Keynote Speech
January 15, 1979
John E. Wesler
Opening Remarks
Good morning and thank you very much for being here, ladies and
gentlemen. My name is John Wesler, Acting Director of the FAA Office of
Environment and Energy.
This conference is being sponsored by the Federal Aviation
Administration in conjunction with the Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
The purpose of this conference is to gain as much insight as possible
from you -- the shippers and receivers of goods -- to be able to better
understand the nature of air freight and the potential impacts that airport
use restrictions could have on that industry.
General
A number of local government and airport authorities throughout the
United States are considering or have indeed already imposed nighttime
airport restrictions on aircraft activity in order to mitigate the sleep
disruption caused by aviation noise. The Secretary of Transportation and
the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration have recognized
the responsibility of local agencies to protect residents against the
adverse environmental impacts of aircraft operations. In the DOT/FAA
Aviation Noise Abatement Policy, of November 18, 1976, it was stated that,
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"...the FAA will encourage a noise abatement plan from airport proprietors
in conjunction with both applications for major airport development grants
and proposals to establish use restrictions, such as curfews or scheduling
and equipment restrictions. The FAA will advise airport operators whether
proposed use restrictions are unjustly discriminatory or place an undue
burden on interstate or foreign commerce because of their impact on the
national air transportation system." One component of the national air
transportation system which is potentially impacted by nighttime use
restrictions is air freight. Serious disruption to the distribution of
air freight would occur mainly because the movement of air freight is to a
very large extent a nocturnal activity in the nation's major air cargo
markets. Over the years, certain shippers have come to regard "next-day
delivery" as essential. Accordingly, the use of air transit has played an
important role to those shippers.
Magnitude of the Problem
Although the potential danger to the air freight industry is
recognized, there are unfortunately little data available anywhere with
which to study not only the magnitude of the direct impacts of nighttime
restrictions on the air freight industry, but also the indirect impacts on
other industries that make significant use of air freight (for example, the
garment industry). Additionally, we know little about potential impacts
of such restrictions on regions of the country that are major origins and
destinations of freight (for example, the NY/NJ region and the Los Angeles/
San Francisco area) or on the overall impact of the U.S. economy itself that
might result from a significant change in the transportation patterns of the
nation.
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There is, therefore, an urgent need to develop basic air freight
industry data so that FAA can better understand the potential problems that
may arise if nighttime restrictions are imposed at several of our major
airports. This understanding will aid FAA in making determinations of
when "undue burdens"on interstate or foreign commerce" will occur as a
result of use restrictions.
The Port Authority of New York & New Jersey Air Cargo Waybill Survey
Most of the specific shipper and consignee oriented information that
we do have today on the air freight industry was obtained from an air cargo
waybill survey conducted by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
in 1973 and 1974.
That survey was conducted at Kennedy and Newark Airports and included
the all-cargo and passenger/cargo operations of both domestic and overseas
airlines, as well as the activity of the freight forwarders. At the
conclusion of that survey, some 28,000 air waybills and forwarder house
bills were collected representing freight on board 1400 different flights.
Practically every piece of useful information on each of these waybills was
recorded. For example, data collected include the names and addresses of
shippers and consignees, commodity, weight of shipment, time of shipment,
and so forth. For freight forwarder shipments, individual forward house
bills were obtained and similar information recorded.
The result was a compilation of a detailed picture of air cargo flows
into and out of the New York/New Jersey metropolitan region. There is a
tremendous amount of data available from the survey and a number of spin-off
studies are possible to provide supplemental data. For example, additional,
more in-depth analyses of air shippers, consignees and freight forwarders
are suggested. That is the point at which FAA is presently and the point
which we hope will be adequately addressed at this conference.
Hopefully, the combined data generated by the Port survey plus the
inputs received here and the follow-on work to be accomplished by the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology will provide greater insight into the
magnitude of some of the problems that may result from airport nighttime
restrictions.
Nighttime (10 p.m. - 7 a.m.) Air Cargo Operations at Port Authority Airports
Some of the initial findings from the Port Authority Waybill Survey
are interesting by themselves and bear mentioning at this time. For
example:
(1) The Port Authority survey found that about 35% of all Kennedy and
Newark Airports' freight moves between 10 p.m. and 7 a.m. -- and that
represented some 472,000 tons in 1977.
(2) "All-cargo" aircraft haul about 94% of all the nighttime tonnage --
which was about 444,000 tons in 1977, and
(3) About 28% of all nighttime tonnage was transfer freight -- i.e.,
freight transshipped through New York on its way to some other final
destination. Transfer tonnage amounted to about 132,000 tons in 1977.
Remaining Activities
There still remains a great deal of work to accomplish. Specifically,
we need to know what would become of the current nighttime freight movements
if nighttime curfews were put into place. What portion of freight movements
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would simply be shifted to daytime air cargo shipments? What portion would
turn to alternative modes of transportation such as rail or truck freight?
What portion, if any, might not be shipped at all? And, in conjunction
with all of these alternatives, what additional costs would be realized by
the shipper or receiver in terms of dollars or time? We need your help to
answer these questions. With these answers we may begin to get a handle on
the potential impact of a curfew type of nighttime use restriction as it
relates to interstate commerce.
Add to the picture, however, the potential impacts of the recent
"Airline Deregulation Act of 1978" and our focus again gets somewhat cloudy.
But I am convinced that our efforts this week will take us far in ultimately
assessing this issue.
Restrictions as a Means to Reduce Aviation Noise Impacts
But, lest we be accused of concentrating too much on the hole and not
enough on the doughnut of the question, some time should be spent on how use
restrictions are viewed in general and nighttime curfews in particular.
There is much that an airport proprietor can do before resorting to
use restrictions such as curfews. These options include such things as:
o designations of areas and times of permissible engine runups;
o close coordination with zoning authorities to preclude further
residential land use encroachments adjacent to the airport; and
o installation of noise barriers at strategic points on the airport.
But in order for the proprietor to determine exactly what his noise
abatement needs are, the following should first be accomplished:
I iWmftf -- ml ffloi *I . "I I- --
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(1) Quantify the nature of the airport's noise problem. Included
here should be a thorough treatment of the current problem --
the numbers and locations of people impacted, the kinds of
activities being undertaken by those people (educational,
residential, recreational, etc.) and an equal treatment of the
desired level of airport noise impact.
(2) Develop a comprehensive list of all actions which can be
implemented and which will reduce noise impacts.
(3) From the start of this effort and throughout its course,
thoroughly coordinate all potential noise control actions with
the users, the local citizenry and FAA; and,
(4) Institute that program which brings about the necessary remedial
relief while minimizing the impositions of such a program to the
airport users and community.
Summary
We have a good start with the November 1976 Aviation Noise Abatement
Policy I mentioned earlier. It is not perfect, but does afford an
excellent foundation from which we may all move forward to alleviate the
adverse impacts of aviation noise. A little more than two years has passed
since the Aviation Noise Abatement Policy's issuance and, as with any
initial concept, improvements suggest themselves as a result of day-to-day
applications. I have mentioned that our policy calls for FAA to make
determinations of impacts of use restrictions (such as curfews) on
commerce. Your efforts at this conference will aid us in that regard.
Equally important, however, is the need for early and continuing extensive
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coordination among all parties who stand to be impacted by potential
proprietor noise plans and use restrictions. We need a more comprehensive
evaluation by the proprietor of all those actions at his disposal (not just
a quick cursory review and selection from a set of use restrictions). We
need a better understanding by all parties of what constitutes an
appropriate use restriction (if one is absolutely necessary) and an
understanding of when that restriction conflicts with the federal areas of
responsibility. We at FAA are hopeful that these objectives can be
accomplished.
Thank you very much for your attention. I will turn you back to
Charles Hoch, our chairperson, who will be attempting to keep the conference
on schedule. I wish you well in your efforts this week.
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Keynote Speech
January 15, 1979
Morris Sloane
Good morning. I am very pleased to welcome you to this conference
on "Air Freight: The Problem of Airport Restrictions" on behalf of the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey.
John Wesler has done an excellent job of presenting the objectives of
our program. I want to fill you in on some background that explains why
this question is of such importance and why answers are so essential.
Noise is a serious problem around most of the nation's hub airports.
A 1974 Federal Aviation Administration analysis indicated that there are
more than six million people in communities around 25 major U.S. airports
in which aircraft noise and vibration cause discomfort, ranging from
considerable annoyance to severe disturbance.
The three airports operated by the Port Authority in the densely
populated New York/New Jersey region are among the most seriously impacted.
This same FAA study reported that there are more than one million people
in the noise impact area around LaGuardia; more than 500,000 around Kennedy
International, and more than 425,000 around Newark International. By rank
order of people affected, the Port Authority-operated airports are first,
third and fourth in the nation, with Kennedy having more people in the
severe noise impacted zone than any other facility.
There is unrelenting pressure from citizens in noise-affected areas
for action that will relieve them of the burden that has intruded on their
lives for more than a decade. There is no question of the legitimacy of
their complaint.
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The Port Authority has been in the vanguard of efforts to reduce
aircraft noise at its source -- the plane's engines -- and our neighboring
communities have been close allies in this struggle. This is the approach
that, to a large extent, reconciles the requirement of maintaining viable
airport operations to serve the economy of the region while satisfying the
need to improve the environment for those who must live and work in noise
impact areas. These activities have gone hand in hand with continuing
actions on the local level to minimize noise effects by administrative and
procedural means.
Progress has been made but questions remain about how far and how
fast we must go to find a balanced solution. The Port Authority believes
that the best way to insure against the possibility of curfews is to quiet
the aircraft fleet as quickly as possible, to the greatest extent possible.
There can be no certainty about the outcome of developments concerning
noise. It is already very late in the game and contingencies like airport
curfews must be explored to prepare for any eventuality. One way or
another, airport communities are determined to quiet the skies above them,
especially during sleeping hours. There is also no way of knowing what
airport noise abatement plans will be viewed as satisfactory by the FAA
in formulating requirements in keeping with its Aviation Noise Abatement
Policy.
It is essential that all parties -- including those in noise-impact
areas around our airports and other hub airports around the nation --
understand the potential economic consequences that may accompany vari-ous
actions. We must know the price of any trade-off for quiet. In the New
York/New Jersey area, as elsewhere air commerce is a major contributor to
the economic well-being of the area served. Hundreds of thousands of jobs
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are tied to the activity of our three airport complex. And the air freight
field is an important and fast-growing component of the industry.
In fact, almost half of all the air freight shipped in and out of
the United States each year is handled at Kennedy International Airport.
With the largest air cargo center in the world and the most frequent overseas
flight service available anywhere in the United States, Kennedy International
has become America's gateway to the world for the air shipper as well as
air traveler. Newark International and LaGuardia Airports handle
considerable tonnage as well. Together the three airports handle well over
one and a half million tons of foreign and domestic cargo and mail a year,
making the New York metropolitan area the nation's leader in air freight
activity. The dollar value of this cargo is about $30 billion of which
$20 billion originates or has a destination in the metropolitan area. It
is estimated that some 150,000 jobs throughout the region are directly
related to the production and distribution of merchandise which is shipped
by air through the metropolitan area airports.
Our stake in the question of the impact of nighttime restrictions is
as great as yours. The- purpose of our conference is to develop answers...
to learn about the dynamics of the industry and the ramifying effects that
curfews at one or more localities would have. We are interested in knowing
whether the industry could shift gears and accommodate airport curfews
without seriously affecting its operation and growth potential.
We want your views on what would happen to current freight movements
if airport curfews became prevalent. What would be lost in the process of
a changeover to daytime hours? To what degree would the loss of the
capability for overnight delivery impair the industry's potential? Which
of the hundreds of industries reliant on air cargo would feel tremors and
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which shock waves? We are, after all, talking about a radical change in
the way an important industry does its business. It's imperative that we
obtain a clear picture of what the fallout would be.
We are pleased that the Port Authority's earlier waybill survey has
provided a foundation on which we can build in addressing these issues.
Now the stage has been reached where we need the benefits of your real-world
experience and expertise.
I am confident that our conference results will be rewarding and I
wish to thank you in advance for your contribution to our important
objectives.
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Keynote Speech
January 16, 1979
Clifton F. von Kann
My name is. Clifton F. von Kann. I am Senior Vice President -
Operations and Airports of the Air Transport Association of America,
the trade association representing most of the nation's scheduled
airlines. I want to discuss with you a new proposal being made today
by the airlines to help resolve the problem of restrictions on airport
use.
The remarks yesterday of ATA's Director of Cargo Sdrvices, Gerry
Godbout, and the ensuing discussion should alert us to the seriousness
of airport use restricitons and how they can erode the ability of the
airline industry to provide full transportation services to meet
public interest requirements. Air freight service is especially
vulnerable to these restrictions.
The current new regulatory atmosphere for both cargo and passengers,
has been created almost overnight by a drastic overhaul of CAB policies
and procedures and the enactment of the Airline Deregulation Act of
1978. This has raised new challenges and opportunities for many cities
and airports.
We find the CAB in a heightened competitive environment going
full bore in granting new route authority, designating new entrants
and authorizing service on many routes that have been dormant; all of
this in addition to a whole array of low fares which have contributed
to a record surge in air traffic. It is difficult to "crystal-ball"
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the overall effect of this deregulation except to say that traffic is
up, load factors are up, and profits are up -- at the moment.
How and where is all this growth to be accommodated? Certain
airports have federally regulated ceilings on operations during certain
hours of the day; LaGuardia, Kennedy, O'Hare and Washington National
all have limitations-, or quotas, for periods of five to fourteen hours
per day. New entries at other airports are finding accommodation
difficult.
A further inhibition to growth arises from the efforts of state
and local governments to enter the field of noise regulation. I will
not attempt to elaborate upon these in detail, but can report that
they almost always result in continuing confrontation, confusion,
uncertainty, and actual or threatened litigation. They involve mountains
of reports and other correspondence; they undermine interstate commerce;
and in some cases they pose safety issues. The are incompatible with
the growth that federal policy now mandates.
How can we deal with the problem of airport use restriction in
the new regulatory environment? Let me suggest one answer, ATA, on
behalf of its member airlines, today is petitioning FAA to issue a
notice of proposed rulemaking to adopt a regulation governing airport noise
abatement plans.
The airlines have taken this important step because we have concluded
that such a regulation, particularly in the light of the expansion of
air transportation and the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, is essential
in the public interest to assure that safety and environmental needs are
met in a manner that is consistent with the laws which affect air
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transportation and air commerce. Effective and expeditious resolution
of Federal, state and local responsibilities for noise abatement is
also essential to avert repetitive and time-consuming litigation in the
courts.
Essentially, the ATA petition calls upon the Federal Aviation
Administration to comply with the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as
amended, by disapproving local noise abatement rules related to air
transportation, which are found to be:
1. Inconsistent with the highest degree of safety in air commerce
and air transportation; or
2. Inconsistent with the efficient utilization of navigable
airspace; or
3. Unduly burdensome to interstate or foreign commerce or unduly
interfering with the national air transportation system; or
4. Unjustly discriminatory; or
5. In conflict with the Federal Aviation Administration's statutory
regulatory authority.
ATA and its member carriers are convinced that the major hope for
bringing order to the disruptive airport noise abatement situation is
for the Federal Government to affirm and exercise it'preemptive authority
in this area. These efforts have been met in the past with governmental
reluctance. The reason frequently advanced by the FAA for refusing to
take affirmative action is that liability could attach to the Federal
Government for damage attributable to aircraft noise at given airports.
As explained in the petition, ATA does not believe that there is, or has
ever been, a valid reason for inaction in an area affecting the vital
interests of the Federal Government, state and local governmental
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authorities, airport proprietors, airport communities, the airline
industry, general aviation, air travellers and shippers and the public
at large.
In lieu of affirmative action, the FAA has partially fulfilled its
responsibilities by participating in the consideration of and challenge
to proposed airport plans only through "advisory opinion" and statements
in local public hearings. This despite the fact that the FAA's public
statements and its internal guidelines have consistently maintained
that state and local governmental authorities cannot exercise their
proprietary or police power in a manner that (1) is inconsistent with
air safety, (2) is inconsistent with the efficient utilization of the
navigable airspace, (3) unduly burdens interstate or foreign commerce,
(4) is unjustly discriminatory, or (5) otherwise intrudes into an area
of exclusive Federal responsibility.
The FAA rightfully contends, and we agree, that the field of airport
noise abatement has not been totally preempted, and that there is a
shared responsibility with state and local authorities that permits
some local action. While the FAA has remained relatively passive, the
scope and pace of state and local activity is now threatening the ability
of air carriers to provide the air transportation services required by
the public interest. The educational and persuasive process involved in
litigation is time-consuming, expensive and difficult for both airport
proprietors and air carriers.
The thrust of the rulemaking proposal would be to establish a
regulatory procedure under which any airport proprietor, desiring to
implement a noise abatement plan that would restrict aircraft operations
in interstate or foreign air transportation, would not be able to
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implement that plan without submitting it to the FAA at least 90 days
in advance of proposed effectiveness. Upon publication in the Federal
Register, any interested party could file a statement in support of or
a complaint against implementation of the plan for a maximum period of
180 days beyond its proposed effectiveness. Interested parties could then
submit written.position statements to the FAA supporting or opposing
the plan, and a formal hearing could be convened. Several levels of
administrative appeal would be provided for before the Administrator
would issue a final decision whether to disapprove a proposed plan or
terminate an existing plan.
The FAA would not be required to approve each airport proprietor
plan, but would be required to take action only upon a finding that a
proposed plan if implemented, or an existing plan, if continued, would
adversely affect a valid Federal interest. Also, the proposed regulation
would authorize (1) disapproval of a proposed plan or (2) termination
of an existing plan on the basis of individual or cumulative impact.
This would permit review and termination of a state or local plan, even
after it had been subjected to the hearing process without disapproval,
based upon a finding that the cumulative effect of that plan, in combination
with other plans implemented or proposed subsequent to its effectiveness,
would jeopardize the safety of aircraft, interfere with the efficient
utilization of the navigable airspace, unduly burden interstate or
foreign commerce, be unjustly discriminatory, or conflict with the Federal
Aviation Administration's regulatory authority.
We in the airlines earnestly hope that this forward looking petition
will help provide a constructive procedure for recognizing the needs of the
communities and the needs of an effective national air transportation system.
__ I - - -- mom~ f
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"Airport Restriction Impact -- Air Cargo and its Associated Environs"
Keynote Speech
January 17, 1979
Albert Bienn
Ladies and gentlemen, we of The Boeing Company are pleased to have been
invited here today to express our views on the topic of this seminar --
"Air Freight: The Problems of Airport Restrictions".
As keynote speaker for this particular day, I am supposed to set the
tone for the day's discussions. I will try to do so through the title I
have selected, "Airport Restriction Impact -- Air Cargo and Its Associated
Environs". In choosing the latter part of the title -- "Its Associated
Environs", the implications are many, but I will hold today to only the
environs of ground cost impact to the airport and the community. I hope
thereby to be able to convey to you only a very small sample of possibili -
ties that might occur as a result of the seminar topic implication.
At the outset, it should be understood that any action affecting the
air cargo industry is an action affecting an essential part of this country's
industrial complex. The distribution element of the design-production-
distribution cycle has become increasingly dependent on air transport
over the past two decades. This dependence took on an important new dimension
with the introduction of jet engines in the late 1950's, and again with
the appearance of wide-body airplanes ten years later. Air cargo revenue
ton mile growth on a world-wide basis (Figure 1) has proceeded at a rate
which represents a doubling about every seven years. (Figure 2) In terms
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of total ton-miles, service continues to be concentrated in the U.S.
Domestic and U.S.-Europe (North Atlantic) geographical areas. (Figure
3) Growth in scheduled cargo revenue ton miles has consistently equaled
or exceeded the growth in scheduled revenue passenger miles. (Figure 4)
In terms of the accelerating importance of air cargo as a standard alternative
to surface transport, the average annual growth of air transport between
1960 and 1977 has consistently and dramatically exceeded the growth rate
of the surface modes.
These trends aren't expected to change over the coming years. Boeing's
analysis (Figure 5), foresees a healthy continuation of the growth of air
cargo on a world-wide basis, as well as within the U.S. World growth to
1992 could range from a doubling to a tripling over 1977 levels, depending
on whether we select a conservative or a "potential" view. (Figure 6)
U.S. domestic growth will average somewhat lower than the world rate, but
still reflects a healthy increase over the coming decade.
The airplane as an industrial distribution element has grown in
importance for a number of reasons. Increased capacity is one. The spread
of service to more areas is another. (Figure 7). But at this point, we
need to understand clearly that the successful development of air cargo in
the U.S., indeed throughout the world, can be largely attributed to the
determination of the air transport industry to make it successful. It
has taken a lot of hard, consistent effort to combat the intrinsic cost
handicap of the air line-haul versus truck, rail, and water. We in the
industry have had to labor mighily against the "Everybody Knows" syndrome.
That is, everybody knows that air costs more than surface, everybody
knows that air is useful for emergency service only. Everybody knows that
air can't be used as a standard distribution method; it costs too much.
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Well, these assumptions aren't consistently true. Well-tried principles
of distribution cost analysis have been invoked by air cargo marketeers
to disprove them in case after case. Shippers are turning more and more
frequently to air transport to eliminate warehousing, increase sales,
decrease handling costs, decrease insurance costs; in other words, to whittle
down the total costs of distribution and produce a higher bottom line figure.
This is the consistent result, a higher bottom-line figure. But it takes a
lot of study, and it takes of lot of understanding. It also takes continued
good airplane service, and reliable schedules.
The degree of success which the air transport industry has achieved
in selling the total distribution cost concept has been demonstrated in
shipper surveys, such as one conducted by Boeing in 1978 (Figure 8). Its
results have been confinned by other surveys. When asked to prioritize
the key factors governing a decision to use air freight, most shippers
cited delivery schedules as the first consideration, customer service as
the second. Cost places third. At this point, we begin to detect a very
important relationship between the continued momentum of air cargo growth,
and the continued ability of carriers to offer optimal service schedules.
The withdrawal of 1/3 of the 24 hours available for air cargo scheduling
would operate directly in opposition to the continued development of air
cargo, because it would have a direct adverse effect on the carriers'
ability to respond to shippers' first priority need -- optimal delivery
schedules.
To fully appreciate this concern, we need to look more closely at what
air cargo marketeers have been talking to shippers about for the past
several years (Figure 9). One of the most effective arguments for using
air cargo in total distribution cost control is to exploit the nighttime
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hours between the close of one day's normal cycle and the beginning
of the next. When distribution can be accomplished at night, it
is least affected by the high costs of holding, of storage, of
warehousing, of extra handling, and the increasingly high costs
associated with those requirements. The optimal arrangement is to
accomplish the line haul in the late night and early morning hours,
leaving the periods at each end for local delivery, packing, processing,
documenting, etc. In this way, products are away from the shipper's
dock by the end of his normal work day, and are ready and waiting on
the receiver's dock towards the beginning of his work day.
There is probably no better demonstration of this principle than
the recent growth and success of small-package air cargo service.
Its ability to serve its customers depends directly on its ability
to exploit nighttime hours. (Figure 10) If, for example, you look
at the concentration of available capacity in the system of Federal
Express, the leader in the development of the small-package service,
the essential role of the night-time period is immediately clear. The
bulk of the capacity is concentrated in the midnight to 0600 period.
The second largest segment is in the evening, 1800 to midnight
period, and the smallest segment is during daylight hours. This
dependence on nighttime service is absolutely essential to Federal
Express, as it is to any carrier operating a "hub-spoke" system and
providing overnight service. (Figure 11) If the "hub" is inaccessible
during the night, then the system is essentially destroyed. (Figure 12)
Federal Express's substantial anticipated forecast growth of 26.5%
annual average between now and 1985 would be dramatically reduced --
if it survived at all.
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Using September 1978 Official Airline Guide schedules as a base
(Figure 13), it can be determined that about 45% of the U.S. domestic
freighter capacity is concentrated in the period between midnight and
0700 in the morning. About 7% of the lower hold cargo capacity of
passenger airplanes move during that period. Applying those indices
to the total tons of cargo uplifted in 1977 (Figure 14), it can be
seen that approximately 628 thousand tons of cargo (Figure 15) move
annually in the U.S. between 2400 hours and 0700 hours. This is the
gross total air cargo, using the 1977 base, which would be affected
if curfews were assumed to proliferate throughout the United States.
By 1990, that total figure goes to 1.4 million tons. Certainly,
a portion of this total could be "saved" by schedule adjustments.
In 1976 the Massachusetts Port Authority, studying this same question
as it specifically applied in Boston, estimated that about 20% of
the schedule could be restored by adjusting arrival and departure times
of those flights operating close to the 2400 and 0700 limits. So
let us assume that only 80% of the night cargo would be displaced.
The dollar results come out something like this. The cents-per-
ton mile figures (Figure 16) can be converted to an average revenue
of $457 per ton on freighter cargo, and $354 per ton on passenger lower
hold cargo. These figures are derived from CAB data. The dollar impact
then, at year-end 1977, reduced by 20% for schedule reoptimization,
would be $214 million (Figure 17). This estimates the potential
annual gross revenue loss to U.S. carriers if restrictions were in
effect throughout the United States, Utilizing a straight line projection,
based on domestic cargo growth previously shown, by 1984 this loss
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would grow to $350 million per year. By 1990, it would amount to
$487 million per year (Figure 18). Cumulatively, this represents
a loss to airline operators of $4.4 billion in revenues between 1979
and 1992, at an average loss of $367 million per year.
The cost impact on airline revenues is in many ways easier to
estimate than the cost impact onshippers, on terminals, and on
communities. But we can scope these effects by looking at studies
that have been done with respect to some specific major terminals.
(Figure 19) Take for example the matter of displacement of airmail
at O'Hare, Chicago, from its accustomed night schedules to daytime
schedules. The U.S. Postal- Service states that about 200 million
pounds of mail transits annually through O'Hare, and another 144
million originates or arrives by air in the Chicago area. This is
preponderantly nighttime traffic. If this demand had to be accommodated
during the daytime, it would completely disrupt capacities available
for other cargo. It is estimated that air freight costs to shippers
would increase by as much as $17 million annually in the resulting shift
to reserved air freight from lower priority rates. (Figure 20) In
Chicago, 70% of total all-cargo operations take place during the curfew
period being contemplated. The Chicago study estimates that up
to 20% of the O'Hare work force of 34,000 employees would be affected
if environmental regulations were to eliminate that heavy concentration
of nighttime operations.
In 1976, a study was conducted by the Massachusetts Port Authority
on the impact of an llPM-7AM curfew on the area served by Logan airport,
Boston. Results were based on a combination of questionnaire survey
and in-depth interview froma master list of 1000 shippers, forwarders,
-H* -~-
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and motor carriers. (Figure 21) The response from shippers estimated
that $16 to $25 million per year could be lost in the form of added costs,
for example, from forced use of reserved space services on daytime flights.
Lost sales volume was estimated at $83 to $101 million per year, traceable
chiefly to reduced ability to offer optimal delivery. We should note in
passing that this substantial impact derived solely from curfew restrictions
at Logan. If curfews were in general effect, especially at Bradley Field,
Hartford and at JFK in New York, the Boston impact could be even greater.
Finally, shippers estimated that the added costs and lost revenues could
be translated into job losses ranging in number from 1350 to 2000. Replies
from freight forwarders and motor carriers combined for an additional
total of $5 to $7 million lost in decreased business, with a nominal 30
to 45 jobs lost. And with respect to these estimates, a final point should
be made. The scenario on which they were based did not call for the elimination
of the 11 to 7 freighter service. It simply shifted the service out of the
curfew period into the evening hours prior to 11 P.M. As severe as that
impact was estimated to be, it might have been substantially worse had
the nighttime, or curfew period, capacity been eliminated completely.
Let me conclude by posing the very broad question, "What would the
economic impact be on a typical American industrial city if curfews were to
come into general effect throughout the United States?"
(Figure 22) Using 1977 data, we see that air cargo shipped out of
American cities ranged from 366,000 tons at Chicago's O'Hare, down to
17,000 tons at New Orleans, the smallest on a list of the top 25 originating
cities. A representative level would be 50,000 tons, in such cities as
Philadelphia, Cleveland, or Minneapolis-St. Paul.
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Further scanning of the data shows that the average wholesale value of
air-shipped commodities is reasonably close to $10.00 per pound. In
other words, the revenue-generating value to a city's economy of one
typical ton of air cargo is $20,000.
We have already established that 600 thousand tons, or 17% of the
total 3.5 million tons moved in 1977 was curfew-sensitive. Seventeen
percent then, or 8500 tons, of the 50,000 tons coming out of our representative
city, is impacted by the curfew. Some of this cargo is re-scheduled by
air, some moves by other modes. However, about 10%, or 850 tons per
year, is lost. It becomes a part of that portion of air cargo --
already discussed -- which simply disappears because it can no longer
be distributed in a manner that makes it saleable. 850 tons generating
$20,000 per ton. That's $17 million. Finally, the "ripple effect" of
the loss of this "gross community product" is measured by economists of
anywhere from 1.25 to 3.00. For our purposes, I suggest we use the 1.8
factor applied by the Massachusetts Port Authority in the study
referenced earlier.
The answer to our question comes out $31 million. $31 million
dollars lost to the economy of an average industrial city if its
airport is closed by a curfew.
I opened my remarks by noting that any action affecting the air cargo
industry is an action affecting an essential element of this nation's
industrial capacity. It is clear from our analysis and from studies
undertaken by others that the imposition of an airport curfew indeed
constitutes an action whose far-reaching, adverse effects need to be
fully understood and carefully considered by any community contemplating
such action.
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Commodity characteristicsCost
Total transportation cost
Transportation rate
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Mode reliability
Carrier schedule
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Intra & inter mode transfer
Damages and pilferage exposure time
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Tracing of lost shipments
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Availability of suitable containers
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Required delivery schedule
Penalties placed on late deliveries
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Commodity density
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Time sensitivity
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Demand reliability for commodity
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6. Shipment size
Boeing shipper survey
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Appendix C
Panels
Monday, January 15, 1979
Morning Panel
Panel Moderator: Joe Windish -- PANYNJ
Panel Members: Urban Reininger -- Franklin Mint
Gerry Godbout -- ATA
Gerry O'Driscoll -- Pan Am
Afternoon Panel
Panel Moderator: Gerry O'Driscoll -- Pan Am
Panel Members: Michael Bell -- Atlanta Airport
Rick Clarke -- ALPA
Joe Hinson -- Federal Express
Dick Marinelli -- American Optical
Stan Rozycki -- Federated Department Stores
Tuesday, January 16, 1979
Morning Panel
Panel Moderator: Gene Mercer -- FAA
Panel Members: Louis Haffer -- AFFA
John Hosford -- AIA/Douglas Aircraft
Ralph James -- Profit by Air
Jack Shelly -- Aviation Development Council
John Pogue -- Delta Air Lines
Afternoon Panel
Panel Moderator: Julie Moll -- DOT
Panel Members: Ed Glatzhofer -- Time
Harvey Safeer -- FAA
Jack Shelly -- Aviation Development Council
Charlie Washer -- American Retail Federation/
Western Traffic Conference
Earl Peck -- Flying Tiger
Pat Harnist -- Viasa Airlines
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Wednesday, January 17, 1979
Morning Panel
Panel Moderator: Bob Simpson -- MIT
Panel Members: L. Max Burris -- U.S. News & World Report
Charlotte Chamberlain -- DOT/TSC
Steve Kaminski -- Seaboard
Wayne Hill -- National Airlines
James Schwab -- Hoechst-Roussel Pharmaceutical
Afternoon Panel
Panel Moderator: Ed Roberts -- DOT/TSC
Panel Members: Bill Augello -- Cut Flower Industry
Cal Brantley -- New England Nuclear
Manfred Fleischer -- Columbia House/CBS
Don Reilly -- AOCI
Seymour Salmirs -- NASA/Langley
Thursday, January 18, 1979
Morning Panel
Panel Moderator: Eric Waldron -- Massachusetts Aeronautics Commission
Panel Members: George Beemer -- Florida Flower Association
David Campbell -- Burlington Northern
Air Freight
Alan Sabol -- Fisher Scientific
Claude Schmidt -- Minneapolis Metropolitan Airport
Commission
Dick Ludders -- Hoyle Tanner Associates
Afternoon Panel
Panel Moderator: Frank Spencer -- Northwestern University
Panel Members: Donna Berman -- Massport
Paul Brotto -- Air Canada
Paul Roberts -- MIT
Herman Friedman -- PANYNJ
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Friday, January
Conference
Moderator:
Speakers:
19, 1979
Summiary
Herman Friedman -- PANYNJ
Joe Windish -- PANYNJ
Gerry O'Driscoll -- Pan Am
Gene Mercer -- FAA
Julie Moll -- DOT
Bob Simpson -- MIT
Ed Roberts -- TSC
Eric Waldron -- MAC
Frank Spencer -- Northwestern
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Mr. William J. Augello
Attorney
Augello, Pezold & Hirshmann, P..C.
120 Main St.
Huntington, N.Y. 11743
(516) 427-0100
Mr. George Beemer
Manager
Florida Flower Assoc.
P.O. Box 1569
Fort Myers, FLA 33902
(813) 332-1771
Mr. Edward Rees Bolton
Manager-Air Company
United Parcel Service
51 Weaver St. OP5
Greewich, CT 06840
(203) 622-6140
Mr. Charles F. Boyle
Rate Analyst
E.R. Squibb & Sons
5 Georges Rd.
New Brunswick, NJ 08619
(609) 545-1300
Mr. Calvin Brantley
V.P.
New England Nuclear
549 Albany St.
Boston, MA 02118
(617) 482-9595
Mr. L. Max Burris
General Traffic Manager
U.S. News & World Report
350 E. 22nd St.
Chicago, IL 06061
(312) 791-1168
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AIR FREIGHT SHIPPERS AND FORWARDERS(cont.)
Mr. David G. Campbell
Regional Manager-Northeast
Burlington Northern Air Freight
240 McClellan Hwy.
E. Boston, MA 02128
(617) 569-5966
Mr. Manfred M. Fleischer
Traffic Manager
Columbia House Div. CBS, Inc.
P.O. Box 1100
Terre Haute, IN 47811
(812) 466-8750
Mr. Edwin F. Glatzhofer
Corp. Mfg. & Dist. Plants Manager
TIME, Inc.
Time/Life Building
Rockefeller Center
New York, NY 10020
(212) 566-2781
Mr. Louis P. Haffer
Exec. V.P. and Counsel
Air Freight Forwarders Assoc. of America
1730 Rhode Island Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 293-1030
Mr. Ralph James
District Mgr.
Profit By Air
8201 N.W. 56.St.
Miami, FLA
(305) 592-4170
Mr. Richard D. Marinelli
General Traffic Mgr.
American Optical Corp.
14 Mechanic St.
Southbridge, MA 01550
(617) 765-9711
Mr. Howard A. Max
Air Operations Mgr.
United Parcel Service
51 Weaver St. OPS
Greenwich, CT 06830
(203) 622-6141
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AIR FREIGHT SHIPPERS AND FORWARDERS(cont.j
Mr. James Mcluskey
Director Corp. Mfg. & Dist.
Time Inc.
Time/Life Building
nockefeller Center
New York, NY 10020
(212) 556-2781
Mr. Martin J. Munroe
United Parcel Service
51 Weaver St. OP5
Greewich, CT 06840
(203) 622-6140
Mr. Urban S. Reininger
Director of Dist.
The Franklin Mint
Franklin Center, PA 19091
(215) 459-6932
Mr. Stanley R. Ro-zycki
Director of Transportation
Federated Dept. Stores, Inc.
222 West Seventh St.
Cincinnati, OH 45202
(513) 852-3529
Mr. Alan F. Sabol
Director, Transportation
Fisher Scientific Co.
711 Forbes Ave.
Pittsburgh, PA 15228
(412) 562-8504
Mr. James B. Schwab
Traffic Mgr.
Hoechst Roussel Pharmaceutical,Inc.
Route 202-206 Nortn
Somterville, NJ 08876
(201) 685-2184
Mr. Charles A. Washer
Transp. Counsel
American Retail Federation
1616 H St., N.W.
Wahsington, D.C. 20006
(305) 943-1453
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AIRLINES
Paul Brotto
Manager, Forecasting & Scheduling
Air Canada Cargo
4333 St. Catherine West
Montreal, Quebec,
CANADA
(514) 874-4519
G.J. Godbout
Director Cargo Services
Air Transport Assoc. of America
1709 New York Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 872-4129
Patrick Harnist
Insurance Manager
VIASA Airlines
Torre Viasa,
Plaza Morelos,
Caracas,
VENEZUELA
(305) 572-9522 x254
H. Wayne Hill
Regional Cargo Marketing Mgr.
National Airlines Inc.
P.O. Box 592055 A.M.F.
Miami, FLA 33159
(305) 874-2315
Joe Hinson
Mgr. Operations Research
Federal Express Corp.
3695 King James
Memphis, TN 38118
(901) 794-0606
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AIRLINES
Richard M. Jackson
Chairman of the Board
Sea..oa.-d World Airlines
John F. Kennedy International Airport
Jamaica, NY 11430
t212) 632-7600
Steve Kaminski
Director of International Devlpmt.
Seaboard World Airlines
John F. Kennedy International Airport
Jamaica, NY 11430
(212) 632-7652
Gerry O'Oriscoll
Manager,Cargo Schedule Planning
?AN AM
Schedules Dept., 9th floor
200 Park Ave.
New York, NY 10017.
(212) 880-1934
Earl M. Peck
Regulatory Economist
Flying Tigers
7401 World Way West
los Angeles, CA 90280
(213) 646-5145
John Pogue
General Ilanager-Cargo Sales
Delta Airlines, Inc.
Hartsfield Atlanta International Airport
Atlanta, GA 30320
(404) 762-2553
Ron Ponder
Director, Operation Research & Planning
Federal Express Corp.
AMF Box 30167
Memphis, TN 38130
(901) 359-3437
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AIRLINES(cont)
General Clifton F. von Kann
Sr. V.P.-Operations and Airports
Air Tra-sport Association of Ame-rica
1709 New York Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 872-4000
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Steven Bauml
Aviation Planner
Port Authority of New York & New Jersey
1 World Trade Center
New York, NY 10048
(212) 466 8486
Michael J. Bell
Financial Analyst
Dept. of Aviation,
Hartsfield Atlanta International Airport
Atlanta, GA 30320
(404) 752-9241
Donna Berman
Manager, Noise Abatement Office
Massport
99 High St.
Boston, MA 02118
(617) 482-2930
Ivan H. Carr
Chief-Planning & Technical Services
Dade County Aviation Dlepartm-ent
P.O. Box 592075
Miami, FLA 33159
(305) 526-2380
B. Errol Corea
Economni st
Port Authority of NY & NJ
1 World Trade Center
New York, NY 10048
(212) 466-7530
Herman Frieeman
Economist
Port Authority of NY & NJ
1 World Trade Center
New York, NY 10048
(212) 466-7518
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Domenic Monterosso
Economic Analyst
Port Authority of NY & NJ
1 World Trade Center
New York, NY 10048
(212) 466-7530
J. Donald Reilly
Exec. V.P.
Airport Operators Council International
1700 K St., N.W.
Washington, D.C.
(202) 296-3270
Sharon Robinson
Massachusetts Port Authority
99 High St.
Boston, MA
(617) 482-2930 x242
Claude C. Schmidt
Director of Operations
Metropolitan Airports Commission
6040 28th Ave., So.
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55450
(612) 726-5778
Morris Sloane
Deputy Director-Aviation Dept.
Port Authority of NY & NJ
1 World Trade Center
New York, NY 10048
(212) 466-7455
Joseph J. Windisch
Economic Analyst
Port Authority of NY & NJ
1 World Trade Center
New York, NY 10048
(212) 466-7530
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AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURER,GOVERNMENT AGENCY,ACADEMIC, CONSULTANTS & OTHER PERSONNEL
Raymond A. Ausrotas
Associate Director
Flight Transportation Laboratory
MIT
Cambridge, MA 02139
(617) 253-7574
Al Bienn
Manager, Cargo Analysis
The Boeing Co.
P.O. Box 3707, MS 6802
Seattle, Washington 98124
(206) 722-8059
C. Chamberlain
Chief Economist Analysis & Forecasting
Transportation Systems Center, DOT
Cambridge, MA 02142
(617) 494-2087
Rick Clarke
Staff Engineer
Airline Pilots Assoc.
1625 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 797-4191
Charles Hoch
Chief, Environmental Policy Div.
Federal Aviation Admn.
800 Independence Ave.,S.W.
Washigton, D.C. 20591
(202) 755-9717
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John E. Hosford
Sr. Staff Engi.neer
Douglas Aircraft Co.
3855 Lakewood Blvd.
Long Beach, CA 90846
(213) 593-6715
Mr. Ron Jackson
Market Planning
De Havilland of Canada
Downsview, Ontario
CANADA
(416) 633-7310
Herb Lev
Managing Editor/Assistant Publisher
AIRCARGO Magazine
888 7th Avenue
New York, NY 10019
(212) 977-8314
Richard Ludders
Airport Planner
Hoyle, Tanner & Assoc
1 Technology Park
Londonderry, NH 03053
(603) 669-5420
Hani Mahmassani
Research Assistant
Center for Transportation Studies
MIT
Cambridge, MA 02139
(617) 253-7114
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MIT
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